INDO-PACIFIC IN THE 21st CENTURY

The coinage of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has gained salience internationally over the last few years and certainly among many policy wonks.  This owes to the fact that Asia-Pacific as a nomenclature no longer encapsulates the growing importance of the region, Indian Ocean Region (IOR), more so the centrality of India in the region. The seeming continuity of the Indian and Pacific oceans and the various seas enclosed therein is where geopolitics of the 21^st century will play out, or so it is expected.

The importance of Indo-Pacific was underscored by the US through two of its major policy decisions – (A) Pivot to Asia policy under Pres. Obama and (B) Changing of the Pacific command to Indo-Pacific command under Pres. Trump. Moreover, the revival of QUAD – a quadrilateral grouping of India, USA, Japan and Australia – at the Manila Summit, indicated towards 2 things primarily. One is growing wariness of western powers and India alike on a more assertive China, and two, the realization that India is the sole power in the region which can act as a counterpoise to China.

In that respect, many questions arise around the geopolitics of Indo-Pacific. Is it a western design of the 21^st century to rein in China? Is India ready to take on a larger responsibility and role in the region? Is India acting out of its national interests? Can India, if required, assert its strategic autonomy? What is the response of China? Let us look into each of these questions to ascertain both the objectivity and the subjectivity of the Indo-Pacific.

 

Is INDO-PACIFIC a western design to rein in China?

Although the countries wouldn’t forthrightly admit it, the purpose behind Indo-Pacific seems to be keeping a tight leash on China. China is emerging as a global economic powerhouse. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is making its ‘global ambitions’ clear by first being an unabashed regional leader. Gone are the days of the purported ‘peaceful’ rise of China. The Belt and the Road Initiative (BRI), the South China Sea wrangle, the chequebook diplomacy they pursue in the countries of ASEAN, South Asia and Africa, et al. All of this indicates not just China’s rise, but their unilateralism and a veritable challenge to the US hegemony.

Even if India gains the centrality and the importance in the Indo-Pacific vocabulary, the actual aim is to rein in China. The shift in US foreign policy was indicated by Barack Obama and carried forward by Donald Trump. One may find Pres. Trump to be more unpredictable,  insular in his foreign policy owing to ‘America First’ approach and the consequent ‘Trade Wars’, the strategic angle, though, is very much aimed at containment of China.

 

Is India ready to take on a larger role in the region?

The early indications are towards a more outward foreign policy which gives primacy to ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘ACT EAST’. In fact, India’s Act East policy has added newer dimensions like East Asia and Indo-Pacific along with the ASEAN countries. While the intention is there, does India have the wherewithal?

India was slightly late to wake up to the challenge posed by China in the region. India traditionally assumed a big brother’s role when it comes to the island nations of the IOR. But in today’s time, these island states don’t shy away from playing the China card against India. The best example is that of Maldives. Mired in its internal squabbles, the present dispensation is ignoring India’s legitimate demands of restoring democracy and rule of law. A more canny China is not bound by any such principles and is more than eager to pump more money into Maldives so as to ensure that the local government toes its line.

Recently, Seychelles blockaded India’s request to secure Assumption Island as its naval base. Similar disenchantments have been seen in Agalega Islands of Mauritius. India may not have lost its leverage yet as the net security provider of IOR, but its economic heft is no match to that of China. In a world of transactional diplomacy, India is clearly behind China.

The ideological heft that India had (and not China) among the newly-independent nations as a pioneer of NAM is slowly eroding too with the growing irrelevance of NAM. Ironically, India’s growing ambitions to set up naval bases is not being received too well by the island nations because of NAM. Theses island states invoke the ‘LUSAKA Declaration’ taken at the NAM Summit in Lusaka which declared the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

 

Is India acting out of its national interests? Can it assert its strategic autonomy?

India’s national interests are evident when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. When it comes to the broader Indo-Pacific which includes the Malacca straits, South China Sea and the Pacific Island states, India wants a rules-based order where there is unimpeded trade & commerce, navigation and overflight. No country should monopolize the sea or air routes. India has been vocal against China in the South China Sea dispute. India’s quest to be part of the QUAD was necessarily to maintain this rules-based order.

When it comes to the IOR, India’s national interests lie in maintaining India’s primacy in the region. India seeks to be the net security provider in the region and the first port-of-call in case of any distress in the region, be it natural or man-made. That is the reason why there is a growing unease due to China’s growing influence in the region. India is wary about China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy which is evidenced by their port development projects in Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Kyaukpyu (Myanmar) which encircles India. China already has a naval base in Djibouti and Gwadar may soon be converted into one. Therefore, India’s involvement in the QUAD and the consequent encirclement of China by an ‘arc of democracies’ is invariably India’s practical diplomacy.

In the recent Shangri-La dialogue, PM Narendra Modi re-asserted the forgotten phrase ‘strategic autonomy’ and reiterated that India is not part of any closed alliances much less military alliances which is aimed at any third country. This indicates that India retains its independence in foreign policy which will not be dictated by the Western countries, even though interests might converge.

 

What is the position of China?

It is well known that China is no longer shy about its muscular diplomacy aided by its 12-trillion dollar economy and large forex reserves. At the same time, China has always been conservative when it comes to antagonizing the Western countries. For instance, China waited for the 99-year lease of Hong Kong to end for it to be handed over by the UK. There was no urgency shown in recapturing it.

At a time, when the global growth rates are floundering, China sees itself in an advantageous position. China is both a huge economy with overcapacity and no shortage of skilled manpower. Europe is dependent on the Chinese economy for its revival, amidst the ongoing global trade wars. It is only the USA which is taking the bull by its horn.

When it comes to Indo-Pacific, China has a calibrated approach. When it comes to the South China Sea, it is not willing to compromise. China carries on with its militarization of the islands like Scarborough shoal, Johnson reef etc., despite Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling against China’s ‘NINE DASH LINE’ claim. But when it comes to the IOR, China is willing to play the role the regional-balancer by offsetting India.

When it comes to QUAD, China has not taken any strong position against it, playing down any security implications thereof. At the same time, China has been diplomatically engaging both Japan and India. At the recent Wuhan Summit as well as at the SCO SUMMIT at Qingdao, China preferred to douse the tensions with India over the Doklam stand-off and renew bilateral ties. China, presumably, is following Teddy Roosevelt’s philosophy: ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick.’

 

Future of Indo-Pacific

Already Indo-Pacific is at the cross-roads of global commodity trade, busy navigations lines, et al. But the security aspect and the geopolitical importance of late has raised doubts whether the region will also be at the cross-roads of geopolitical conflicts? What happens when an unstoppable force meets an immovable object? This is not in the best interests of any country in the region, certainly not of India’s. If the stakes get any higher, the chances of a climb-down would also become more difficult.

The positives for Indo-Pacific are increased trade and prosperity in the region, including people-to-people connect. This gives an opportunity for the island and littoral nations to develop their economy with a significant boost to trade and tourism. For China, the BRI will be a litmus test of its new-age diplomacy. The positive spin-off would be infrastructure development, including ports, digital connectivity, etc.  For India, it is a unique opportunity to showcase its leadership skills and catapult onto the global high table. For USA, it is a last-ditch effort at maintaining its pre-eminence in a growing multi-polar world order.

Come what may, we are certainly headed towards interesting times with the economic locus and the global focus centered on this region.

INDO – US Imbroglio

The definition of imbroglio in the Merriam-Webster is, inter alia, an intricate or complicated situation, which fits right in as far as INDO-US bilateral relations are concerned.  This write-up is a look at the historicity of the bilateral relations and the global context and how both the countries have grown into a more cohesive and interdependent partnership, even though there lay uncertainties. The fact of the matter is, from the narrative of “World’s largest democracy and world’s oldest democracy coming together” to the epochal “India and US are natural allies” to the recent “US could be India’s best partner”, India and USA have come a long way and seen the good and bad of it. The recent meet of Prez Obama and PM Modi definitely infused a new air of optimism to the relationship. Officially we are strategic partners, alright. Yet, a more objective understanding of the various aspects of the mutual concerns is required. The present context of the go-aheads and continuing impasses will make it clear that it is more complicated than meets the eye.

The questions remain – Has the dehyphenation policy of USA towards South Asia worked to India’s advantage? How does India view USA’s sincerity in the war against terror? What does USA really think of India beyond the bromides?

Growing convergences have not eliminated existing divergences.

– Kanwal Sibal

 

Historical context

India during the time of its independence was unfortunately caught between the post WW II world order of First World of USA along with Western Europe and Second World of the erstwhile USSR and countries of Eastern Europe. This world order invested in ideological leanings and having mutual incompatibility had even lesser patience with the newly independent or post-colonial states. India came to be a part of the majority of the newly independent states of ‘Global South’. India chose not to be part of any overt alliance and pioneered what came to be known as the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). (To be discussed in another blog.)

Interesting to note that, amidst all this, USA and the first world were essentially seen as imperialist nations and USSR, because of communism, seen as opposed to imperialism. Also, USA with its superpower status and economic prowess were seen as neo-colonialists. Needless to mention, most of India’s freedom fighters who were to be part of the government of independent India were anti-imperialists and had majorly socialist principles, in particular the first PM Pt. Nehru. Still, our socialism was more akin to Fabian socialism rather than to the Marxian view. India preferred USSR over USA.

 

Saga of Indo-US relations is a saga of 50 wasted years.

– David Malone

The earlier Indo-US relations have been believed to be shaped by ideologies, strategic perspectives and of course national interests. But then we were never really Marxists and most importantly we were a democratic nation, so why then did we tilt towards the USSR?

The overwhelming reason here is geography and geopolitics thereafter. We were a nation sandwiched in a hostile neighborhood. Pakistan became our sworn enemy right after our independence. China waged a war against us in 1962, defying Panchsheel. And under these circumstances we couldn’t have afforded a hostile world power of USSR and that too in the same continent. That would’ve been anathema to our existence. We estranged USA even though it aided us in the war against China.

 

Geography defines a state’s position on a map.

– Robert Kaplan

This was the beginning of 2 countries ironically intrinsic to NAM, India and Pakistan, having pro-USSR and pro-USA leanings respectively. Funny that Pakistan draws its geopolitics almost entirely from India’s whereas we take up the mantle of all regional balancing of power in our foreign policy calculations!

End of Cold War

Gulf Wars marked the beginning of transformation in the Indo-US relations. For the first time India offered logistical support to USA in a war. This period also marked the beginning of Unipolar World Order. The 2 distanced democracies came nearer.

90’s marked a sea-change in India’s economic policy during PVN Rao govt. thanks to the opening of our economy and adherence to liberalization, privatization and globalization aka LPG. This also marked a shift in our foreign policy. Under the leadership of AB Vajpayee and George Bush, India and USA undertook NSSP (Next Steps in Strategic Partnership) which entailed –

• Civil Nuclear Cooperation
• Cooperation in space and high technology
• Broad-based consultations on issues of mutual concern
• Institutionalization of relations

But it was Dr. Manmohan Singh and George W. Bush, who made sure the civil-nuclear deal saw the light of the day. 123 agreement on civil-nuclear cooperation was thus signed. This was a watershed moment. Especially because both the leaders defied the resistance of the tumultous domestic players in their respective countries towards the clinching of the deal.

Another major development was India voting against ‘friend’ Iran at the IAEA to confirm their stand aligning to that of US. This was a major confidence building measure (CBM) in our partnership. This is seen as the highest point in Indo-US partnership after which it is claimed to have plateaued.

 

Major Issues

Civil-Nuclear Issue

Since 1974, USA was never comfortable with our nuclear program. The equation became even more awkward when India refused to be a signatory of the NPT on repeated insistence of US and IAEA. The changing geopolitical scenario after the fall of USSR prompted USA to rethink its South Asia policy, particularly India. China’s ascent was an undeniable reality. Although US were in very strong terms with China owing to their bilateral trade, China’s growing military and maritime powers in the region could no longer be ignored.

In 1998, the Pokhran tests were widely criticized by the International Community and especially the NPT signatory countries. But effective rounds of diplomacy between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott ensured that India’s geographical anxieties and security concerns were highlighted. The question of Credible Minimum Deterrence, too, was of strategic importance to India.

The Indo-US deal hitherto laid to rest all the inhibitions of the other states. India therefore became the first non-signatory of NPT to negotiate commercial nuclear fuel with IAEA states courtesy Indo-US deal. But somewhere this hadn’t really taken the next step. There were huge expectations out of the Pres. Obama trip to India. The bone of contention so far being – USA wanted to track the nuclear fuel and equipment that is being supplied to India over and above the IAEA safeguards. India, on the other hand, is opposed to this intrusion and wants to maintain its strategic autonomy. Interesting to note that in the recent negotiations between PM Narendra Modi and Prez Barack Obama, it has been upheld that IAEA safeguards will be enough for supervision of nuclear supply and US will desist any intrusion. This, we can say, is a diplomatic victory right there.

The other issue, which is a major issue, is that of Nuclear Liability Law or as it is known as Civil Liabilities for Nuclear Damages Act (CLNDA) which puts a financial liability cap of any nuclear accident on the operator.  A nuclear damage cost over and above the cap has to be drawn upon by the GoI from the Special Drawing Rights. As it is understood, there was a reservation among the American firms on the clause 17 of the Liability Law and the deal as it stands now is that out of the pool of INR 1500cr for indemnities, 750cr has to be drawn from an insurance pool of different insurance firms, the other 750cr will be provided for by the government of India. This may seem like a big concession to the US, but it is in order to expedite the commercial nuclear energy production in India to meet the ambitious target of 20000MW by 2020. The score as it stands – India: 1, USA: 1.

This was supposed to be the ‘centerpiece’ of the strategic partnership between India and USA and this stands ‘clinched’ as was triumphantly declared. The follow-up would be the trick right there, but given the single-minded intent of our PM, it seems this one’s a clincher!

Global Security and Terrorism

The growing convergence between India and USA is primarily because both the nations are in the forefront of war against terrorism. This shift in US policy happened especially after the 9-11 attacks and US declaring ‘War on Terrorism’. The only caveat here is India’s view of US’ role in this war which is being fought almost on a daily basis. US’ untimely exit in Syria and Afghanistan has been even more baffling especially in the light of advent of ISIS and AfPak terror groups. US’ emphasis on the terror groups of Northwest Pakistan, while indifference towards the Pakistani Punjab based terror groups which are targeted at India. US approach of giving doles to Pak establishment and treating them with kid gloves on one hand, while admonishing them on keeping safe havens of terror seems to be a vague stand. India has often wondered whether this is a war against terror or one of convenience and geopolitical interests.

While both the countries have to be on the forefront in this rather asymmetric warfare, there has to be a mutual trust. While dehyphenation policy has been responsible for US and India looking at mutual interests independently, India’s strategic interests involve peace and stability in the region.  Also, it was encouraging to hear Obama’s keenness on having India in the UN Security Council. This has been a long pending demand of India, with only sporadic support from the International Community in the UN General Assembly. This really has to move beyond the platitudes and has to see the light of the day.

 

Joint Strategic Vision

This was the next big highlight of the Obama-Modi meet, if not the most significant. This raised the concerns over the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. This is seen as the beginning of the roadmap for a Washington-New Delhi alliance in the Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific region. Washington, on its part, has been long soliciting India’s partnership in the Indian Ocean region. New Delhi walked into this JSV owing to its discomfort over growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. This may herald a new direction in the Indo-US strategic partnership as is seen.

Totalization agreement

This has been a major sticking point, traditionally. According to Nasscom, Indians on H1 and L1 visas pay almost $1 billion in social security taxes in the US annually, without getting the benefits. These are about 6.2% of social security taxes and 1.45% of medicare taxes of US (2013 figures). The totalization agreement would guarantee a payout or refund of the amount or ensure benefit rights of the workers. USA has totalization agreements with 21 countries including Japan and South Korea from Asia. Surely this has to be pursued further as there has been no clarity yet.

Immigration Reforms

Even the concerns over H-1B visa issue had been raised by PM Modi to Prez Obama. Obama has assured Modi that he will look into India’s concerns on the H-1B visa issue as part of his comprehensive immigration reform. This has to be taken up by US Congress, so this may yet take some time!

Renewable Energy

Apart from the heavy-duty Nuclear deal, the most significant outcome was that of a promised $4bn investment in the setting-up and operation of renewable energy sources like Wind energy, Solar energy, etc. in India. This is also a boost to both the countries’ commitment towards production and harness of clean energy and to reduce the global carbon footprint.

Now, there are more issues of IPR, the recently agreed upon WTO’s trade facilitation agreement, et al. But the takeaway so far has been that there is definitely an urge to go ahead in many of the areas. The domestic opposition at both ends is multi-faceted and not just in politics, but also in civil society, interest groups, pressure groups, etc., but overwhelmingly, the two countries don’t want to halt any time soon.