The coinage of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has gained salience internationally over the last few years and certainly among many policy wonks. This owes to the fact that Asia-Pacific as a nomenclature no longer encapsulates the growing importance of the region, Indian Ocean Region (IOR), more so the centrality of India in the region. The seeming continuity of the Indian and Pacific oceans and the various seas enclosed therein is where geopolitics of the 21st century will play out, or so it is expected.
The importance of Indo-Pacific was underscored by the US through two of its major policy decisions – (A) Pivot to Asia policy under Pres. Obama and (B) Changing of the Pacific command to Indo-Pacific command under Pres. Trump. Moreover, the revival of QUAD – a quadrilateral grouping of India, USA, Japan and Australia – at the Manila Summit, indicated towards 2 things primarily. One is growing wariness of western powers and India alike on a more assertive China, and two, the realization that India is the sole power in the region which can act as a counterpoise to China.
In that respect, many questions arise around the geopolitics of Indo-Pacific. Is it a western design of the 21st century to rein in China? Is India ready to take on a larger responsibility and role in the region? Is India acting out of its national interests? Can India, if required, assert its strategic autonomy? What is the response of China? Let us look into each of these questions to ascertain both the objectivity and the subjectivity of the Indo-Pacific.
Is INDO-PACIFIC a western design to rein in China?
Although the countries wouldn’t forthrightly admit it, the purpose behind Indo-Pacific seems to be keeping a tight leash on China. China is emerging as a global economic powerhouse. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is making its ‘global ambitions’ clear by first being an unabashed regional leader. Gone are the days of the purported ‘peaceful’ rise of China. The Belt and the Road Initiative (BRI), the South China Sea wrangle, the chequebook diplomacy they pursue in the countries of ASEAN, South Asia and Africa, et al. All of this indicates not just China’s rise, but their unilateralism and a veritable challenge to the US hegemony.
Even if India gains the centrality and the importance in the Indo-Pacific vocabulary, the actual aim is to rein in China. The shift in US foreign policy was indicated by Barack Obama and carried forward by Donald Trump. One may find Pres. Trump to be more unpredictable, insular in his foreign policy owing to ‘America First’ approach and the consequent ‘Trade Wars’, the strategic angle, though, is very much aimed at containment of China.
Is India ready to take on a larger role in the region?
The early indications are towards a more outward foreign policy which gives primacy to ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘ACT EAST’. In fact, India’s Act East policy has added newer dimensions like East Asia and Indo-Pacific along with the ASEAN countries. While the intention is there, does India have the wherewithal?
India was slightly late to wake up to the challenge posed by China in the region. India traditionally assumed a big brother’s role when it comes to the island nations of the IOR. But in today’s time, these island states don’t shy away from playing the China card against India. The best example is that of Maldives. Mired in its internal squabbles, the present dispensation is ignoring India’s legitimate demands of restoring democracy and rule of law. A more canny China is not bound by any such principles and is more than eager to pump more money into Maldives so as to ensure that the local government toes its line.
Recently, Seychelles blockaded India’s request to secure Assumption Island as its naval base. Similar disenchantments have been seen in Agalega Islands of Mauritius. India may not have lost its leverage yet as the net security provider of IOR, but its economic heft is no match to that of China. In a world of transactional diplomacy, India is clearly behind China.
The ideological heft that India had (and not China) among the newly-independent nations as a pioneer of NAM is slowly eroding too with the growing irrelevance of NAM. Ironically, India’s growing ambitions to set up naval bases is not being received too well by the island nations because of NAM. Theses island states invoke the ‘LUSAKA Declaration’ taken at the NAM Summit in Lusaka which declared the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.
Is India acting out of its national interests? Can it assert its strategic autonomy?
India’s national interests are evident when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. When it comes to the broader Indo-Pacific which includes the Malacca straits, South China Sea and the Pacific Island states, India wants a rules-based order where there is unimpeded trade & commerce, navigation and overflight. No country should monopolize the sea or air routes. India has been vocal against China in the South China Sea dispute. India’s quest to be part of the QUAD was necessarily to maintain this rules-based order.
When it comes to the IOR, India’s national interests lie in maintaining India’s primacy in the region. India seeks to be the net security provider in the region and the first port-of-call in case of any distress in the region, be it natural or man-made. That is the reason why there is a growing unease due to China’s growing influence in the region. India is wary about China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy which is evidenced by their port development projects in Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Kyaukpyu (Myanmar) which encircles India. China already has a naval base in Djibouti and Gwadar may soon be converted into one. Therefore, India’s involvement in the QUAD and the consequent encirclement of China by an ‘arc of democracies’ is invariably India’s practical diplomacy.
In the recent Shangri-La dialogue, PM Narendra Modi re-asserted the forgotten phrase ‘strategic autonomy’ and reiterated that India is not part of any closed alliances much less military alliances which is aimed at any third country. This indicates that India retains its independence in foreign policy which will not be dictated by the Western countries, even though interests might converge.
What is the position of China?
It is well known that China is no longer shy about its muscular diplomacy aided by its 12-trillion dollar economy and large forex reserves. At the same time, China has always been conservative when it comes to antagonizing the Western countries. For instance, China waited for the 99-year lease of Hong Kong to end for it to be handed over by the UK. There was no urgency shown in recapturing it.
At a time, when the global growth rates are floundering, China sees itself in an advantageous position. China is both a huge economy with overcapacity and no shortage of skilled manpower. Europe is dependent on the Chinese economy for its revival, amidst the ongoing global trade wars. It is only the USA which is taking the bull by its horn.
When it comes to Indo-Pacific, China has a calibrated approach. When it comes to the South China Sea, it is not willing to compromise. China carries on with its militarization of the islands like Scarborough shoal, Johnson reef etc., despite Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling against China’s ‘NINE DASH LINE’ claim. But when it comes to the IOR, China is willing to play the role the regional-balancer by offsetting India.
When it comes to QUAD, China has not taken any strong position against it, playing down any security implications thereof. At the same time, China has been diplomatically engaging both Japan and India. At the recent Wuhan Summit as well as at the SCO SUMMIT at Qingdao, China preferred to douse the tensions with India over the Doklam stand-off and renew bilateral ties. China, presumably, is following Teddy Roosevelt’s philosophy: ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick.’
Future of Indo-Pacific
Already Indo-Pacific is at the cross-roads of global commodity trade, busy navigations lines, et al. But the security aspect and the geopolitical importance of late has raised doubts whether the region will also be at the cross-roads of geopolitical conflicts? What happens when an unstoppable force meets an immovable object? This is not in the best interests of any country in the region, certainly not of India’s. If the stakes get any higher, the chances of a climb-down would also become more difficult.
The positives for Indo-Pacific are increased trade and prosperity in the region, including people-to-people connect. This gives an opportunity for the island and littoral nations to develop their economy with a significant boost to trade and tourism. For China, the BRI will be a litmus test of its new-age diplomacy. The positive spin-off would be infrastructure development, including ports, digital connectivity, etc. For India, it is a unique opportunity to showcase its leadership skills and catapult onto the global high table. For USA, it is a last-ditch effort at maintaining its pre-eminence in a growing multi-polar world order.
Come what may, we are certainly headed towards interesting times with the economic locus and the global focus centered on this region.
astronomick 